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Metaphors as Communication
Theory
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... the conduit metaphor is leading us down a
technological and social blind alley. That blind
alley is mass communications systems coupled
with mass neglect of the internal. human systems
responsible for nine-tenths of the work in communicating.
We think we are 'capturing ideas in words,' and
funneling them out to the greatest public in the
history of the world.

Jtate University. 'lfer research
areas are rhetorical theory and criticism, visual communication, and
relationships between popular culture
and identity. Jhe can be reached at
petersov@gvsu. edu.

But if there are no ideas 'within' this endless flood
of words, then all we are doing is replaying the
myth of Babel-centering it, this time, around a
broadcasting tower (Reddy, 310).

M

etaphors guide perception of, thought about, and
action toward phenomena of human existence,
including various practices and forms of communication. The writings of prominent scholars both illustrate
and assert this fact (Aristotle, 1954, 1991; Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Black, 1962; Bruns, 1987; Burke,
1962, 1978; Carlston, 1987; Carey, 1989; Fromm, 1956;
Lakoff, 1987, 1996; Lakoff &Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff
& Turner, 1989; Ortony, 1979; Postman & Weingartner, 1969; Reddy, 1979; Ricoeur, 1975). One of the most
popular and pervasive metaphors of communication is
the conduit metaphor.
The conduit metaphor, and the transmission models
it informs, remain the dominant perspective-shaping
metaphor of communication despite scholarly attempts
to complicate matters. In 1979, Reddy critiqued the
conduit metaphor and offered an alternative to it, but
his alternative was a complex "toolmakers paradigm''
that had little impact in the wider discourses about com-
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munication. Borrowing from Reddy (1979), Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) also discussed and critiqued the conduit
metaphor of communication, but offered no alternative to it. In 1989, Carey offered both a critique of the
transmission view of communication and an alternative
view, "communication as ritual," but this alternative
was presented as a complementary-supplemental to
the transmission view of communication and unable
to stand alone. While these and other discussions have
contributed to a more complex understanding of communication in academic circles, they have done little
to challenge the widespread appeal and explanatory
power of the conduit metaphor and related models
and views of human communication. This essay offers
two viable artistic metaphors of communication as
alternatives: "exposition is painting" and "persuasion
is throwing."
The metaphors "exposition is painting" and "persuasion is throwing" are not simply fanciful uses of
speech-they are avenues to understanding experiences
and concepts of everyday life. As Lakoff and Johnson
argue, "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of
which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (3). Because the concepts we live by
govern our thought, actions, perceptions, and relations,
our conceptual system "plays a central role in defining
our everyday realities" (3).
New metaphors, as well as conventional metaphors
have the power to define reality (157). "Though questions of truth do arise for new metaphors," Lakoff
and Johnson assert, "the more important questions
are those of appropriate action. In most cases, what
is at issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor but
the perceptions and inferences that follow from it and
the actions that are sanctioned by it (158). Because
people in various contexts of power may impose their
metaphors on others, they may shape the way others
make sense of their experiences and their world (157).
Because powerful people get to impose their metaphors of communication, they are in a position to
shape understandings of communication in more or
less responsible ways. This is especially true of those
who theorize, talk about, write about, and teach communication.

Metaphors and Models
Scholars throughout the ages have
asserted the creative-logical power
of metaphors and models, and their
significance in sense making. In
early conceptualizations of rhetoric, Aristotle (1991) illustrates the
profound effect of metaphor as a
trope of speech and poetry and how,
compared to other rhetorical methods
and tropes, "[m]etaphor most brings
about learning" (Kennedy, 243-244).
Many subsequent discussions of
metaphor have reflected Aristotle's
primarily stylistic perspective, but
others have offered more complex and
foundational explanations. In Models
and Metaphors (1962), for example,
Max Black attempts to clarifY the
ontological character of philosophical inferences from grammar. His
interaction view of metaphor is an
extension of I. A. Richards' (1936)
formulation, which he describes thus:
"our thoughts [about the two terms
featured in a metaphor] are 'active
together' and 'interact' to produce a
meaning that is a resultant of that
interaction" (38). Black's extension
of this understanding recognizes
the possibility of creating new (not
simply conventional) metaphors, and
the possibility that metaphors themselves are affected by the instances of
their use.
In his chapter "Models and Archetypes,"Black (1962) relates metaphors
to models. Cautioning against simple
comparisons of metaphor to brief
statements and of models to allegory
or fable, Black writes,
Use of theoretical models
resembles the use of metaphors
in requiring analogical transfer
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of a vocabulary. Metaphor and model-making
reveal new relationships; both are attempts to
pour new content into old bottles. But a metaphor
operates largely with commonplace implications.
You need only proverbial knowledge, as it were,
to have your metaphor understood; but the maker
of a scientific model must have prior control of a
well-knit scientific theory if he is to do more than
hang an attractive picture on an algebraic formula.
Systematic complexity of the source of the model
and capacity for analogical development are of the
essence. (238-239)
In other words, while metaphors and models have much
in common, their difference is a matter of sophistication: metaphors are more familiar, commonplace, and
proverbial, while models are more specialized, complex,
and theoretical. As Toulmin (1953) put it:
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a great virtue of a good model is that it does suggest
further questions, taking us beyond the phenomena
from which we began, and tempts us to formulate
hypotheses which turn out to be experimentally
fertile ... Certainly this is the suggestiveness, and
systematic deployability, that makes a good model
something more than a simple metaphor. (38-39)
Despite this difference in sophistication between
metaphors and models, however, basic analogies or
"root metaphors" often underlie theories upon which
models are constructed (Pepper, 1942, 91-92). When
a root metaphor operates as a foundation to a model,
its structural characteristics become basic concepts
of explanation and description for the model. This is
why we often find simple, common metaphors corresponding to more complex, sophisticated theoretical
models.
Kenneth Burke (1962) explains the part metaphors
play in how people make sense of complex processes
and phenomena by showing how the literal or realistic
application of metaphor "brings out the thisness of
a that, or the thatness of a this" in the form of perspective (503). The result of the relationship between
metaphor and perspective is '"incongruity,' because
the seeing of something in terms of something else
involves a 'carrying-over' of a term from one realm
into another [non-identical realm]"(504). Ricoeur's 1be
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Rule ofMetaphor (1975) offers an extended discussion of
understandings of metaphor throughout history and in
rhetoric, poetics, linguistics, and philosophy. The theme
of his analysis is that "metaphor is the rhetorical process
by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe reality" (7) .This, Ricoeur argues,
is accomplished not by concepts or contexts, but by the
humanly invented verb "to be" which can at the same
time signify in a metaphor both "is not" and "is like."
The significance of metaphor is not only asserted
in scholarship, but is reflected in the ways thoughtful people have gone about trying to understand and
explain complex processes. In 7beArt ofLoving (1956),
for example, Erich Fromm follows out the metaphor
"love is an art" in both theory and practice. In Teaching as a Subversive Activity (1969), Neil Postman and
Charles Weingartner consider and discard numerous
metaphors of teaching (e.g., teaching is gardening,
teaching is weight training) before settling on the
metaphor "teaching is meaning-making." In Moral
Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don't
(1996), George Lakoff analyzes the language of politics
to discover metaphors of family-based morality (e.g.,
conservative is strict father morality, liberal is nurturant
parent morality) and implications of these metaphors
for political practice.
As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have observed, "Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language
but in thought and action'' (3). As humans who live in a
complex world, we often use conventional metaphors to
guide our understandings without conscious awareness
of that we are doing so (4). We also use newly designed
metaphors to make sense of familiar phenomena (and
new phenomena) in new and different ways. In either
case, metaphors help us "understand and experience one
kind of thing in terms of another" (5).
Usually, the second term/concept in a metaphor is
more grounded in physical or cultural experience than
the first, offering a more concrete means by which to
understand the first. The second term/concept also
highlights and hides various aspects of the first. For
example, in the metaphor "life is a journey," something
quite complex, "life," is being metaphorically related to
something simpler, or at least more directly experienced
and more easily understood: "a journey."We know that

journeys involve travel through time
and space Qourneys highlight travel,
time, and space). We know they often
involve choices along pathways and
obstacles and rewards Qourneys highlight choices, pathways, obstacles, and
rewards). We also know that others
may come and go and that we will
gather experiences along the way
Qourneys highlight other travelers
and varied experiences). This is different from, say, the metaphor "life is a
gift" where such things as gift-givers,
gratitude, and value are emphasized.
Because we have concrete cultural
and physical experiences of journeys
(the second part of the metaphor), we
can use journeys to make sense oflife
(the more complex first part of the
metaphor).
In what follows, I turn to the
phenomenon of communication
itself. First, I discuss the virtues
and vices of dominant communication models and metaphors. Then I
consider some prominent alternative models and metaphors, and
why they have failed to challenge
more dominant understandings.
Finally, I present two metaphors of
communication to the reader for consideration. Each metaphor regards a
different genre of communication
(one pertains to exposition, the other
persuasion) but both are relevant to
various forms of communication
(e.g., spoken, written). Compared
to other options, these metaphors
offer a more complete alternative
to the conduit metaphor for two
main reasons. First, these metaphors
and the broader "communication is
art" metaphor they entail, highlight
the human, artistic complexities of
process (action) over the simplifica-
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tion of product (stuff). And second,
these metaphors highlight qualities of
transmission in much the same way
as the conduit metaphor. Consequently, they are capable of replacing
(rather than simply supplementing or
complicating) the dominant conduit
metaphor.

The 'Iransmission Models and
the Conduit Metaphor

20

Human communication is difficult to
describe. Situated in various social and
historical contexts, particular to individual persons, and infinitely complex,
our speech and writing practices defy
adequate description and explanation.
Not surprisingly, attempts to conceptualize communication processes are
fraught with difficulty. Probably the
most familiar attempt to make sense
of communication is the transmission model (otherwise known as the
SMCR model, the speaking model,
the communication model, the transaction model, etc.). The transmission
model, or variations ofit, can be found
in many introductory communication
textbooks and most speech textbooks
(e.g., Bovee, 2003; Brydon & Scott,
2003; Hamilton, 2003; Koch, 2004;
Lucas, 2001; Pearson, Nelson,
Titsworth & Harter, 2003; Snellow,
2003; Tubbs & Moss, 2003; Tuman
& Fraleigh, 2003; Verderber & Verderber, 2003).
The SMCR version of the transmission model of communication
describes the process of communication as sending. Specifically, a Sender
sends a Message through a Channel
to a Receiver or Audience (who may
also be a Sender). Communication is
accomplished in a particular Context
(or Situation) despite Noise (both

internal and external) and it often elicits Feedback.
This popular, dominant, and widespread depiction of
communication grows out of human experience with
material reality and has significant explanatory strength.
Like other depictions, it is a result of our tendency to
make sense of unbounded phenomena by describing
them in more concrete and bounded terms.
Related versions of the transmission model often
include components (key terms) of the SMCR model.
Some include the terms "encoding," "decoding," and
"symbols" and further highlight "information transfer"
as the essence of the process at hand (see Brydon &
Scott, 2003, Hamilton, 2003; Snellow, 2003). Some
older versions of the model deemed unsatisfactory
include the linear model (outdated because of it flows
in only one direction), and the interactive model, a twoway, turn-taking depiction of information transfer (see
Snellow, 2003). A more recent version of the transmission model is the transactional model (see Brydon &
Scott, 2003; Snellow, 2003; Tuman & Fraleigh, 2003).
In this model, sending and receiving is described as a
simultaneous exchange occurring between two or more
people.
Transmission models of communication have their
roots in religion and the transportation of information through space for the purposes of control (Carey,
1989). Borrowing terms from information processing of telecommunications technologies, the models
adequately explain the sharing of simple, generic, and
widely agreed-upon information and reflect, to some
degree, the practice of quotation and the translation of
expressions from one language to another. The models
are implicit in many studies of public address and other
qualitative communication scholarship and are even
more common in, if not essential to, social scientific
communication research.
Unfortunately, however, by reducing complex, timesensitive, situated, and potentially reality-building
processes into simple deliveries of information "stuff,"
transmission models have the tendency to contribute
to the chaos of modern culture (Carey, 1989, 34). As
Reddy (1979) puts it, we have come to hold the mistaken view that "the more signals we can create, and
the more signals we can preserve, the more ideas we
'transfer' and 'store.' We neglect the crucial ability to
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reconstruct thought patterns ... and this ability founders" (310). In schools, for example, standardized testing
and assessment emphasizing "subject matter" give
teachers incentive to teach "facts" rather than skills in
reading, listening, writing, logic, and critical thinking.
The prevalence of free-floating information "stuff" on
TV and the on internet gives people a sense that information is a thing easily obtained by searching through
all the "stuff" out there.
Even without TV, the internet, and the public school
system, transmission models have problems because they
imply that if people could just say things the "right way"
(encode ideas correctly, overcome noise), others would
understand them. They also suggest that simply understanding other people is all that is required to reach
agreement or solve problems arising between them.
Such notions pose obvious difficulties for conceptualizing intercultural and political communication where
values and interests are often at stake and in competition
and may change in the process of deliberation.
Also troubling is how, in transmission models, successful communication is understood of as reception,
but it is unclear how capacities of reception grow and
develop. Furthermore, the tendency of transmission
models to bracket aesthetic or "incidental" aspects of
communication undermines nuances of interaction. In
this way, rhyme becomes superficial, oxymoron becomes
contradiction, and sarcasm becomes hostility. Incentives to clarity and simplicity take precedence over other
viable (artful, esoteric, witty, idiosyncratic, experimental)
tactics of communication.
This excerpt illustrates how the transmission model
reduces good communication to clear and unambiguous
communication, sacrificing artful, comedic, or other uses
of intentional contradiction in the interest of effective
information transfer:
... no two people encode a message in quite the
same way. What's important is that you encode your
message in a way that allows your audience to grasp
your meaning ... if your words and body language
conflict, an audience is more likely to believe your
body language and thus may receive a message you
didn't intend to send. To avoid confusion, effective speakers carefully coordinate their words and
behavior. (Bovee 9)
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In Metaphors T#; Live By (1980) Lakoff and Johnson
critique transmission models of communication by identifying them as entailments of the conduit metaphor.
Referring to Reddy (1979), they show how, according
to the conduit metaphor, words are seen as containers
of meanings and minds are seen as containers of words.
Communication occurs when words carry (or transmit)
meanings along a conduit (by means of a medium such
as speech or text) from one mind to another. Lakoff and
Johnson show the flaws with this way of understanding
communication by offering examples where context is
necessary for understanding and where words mean
different things to different people (1980, 12).
While Lakoff and Johnson effectively point out the
weaknesses of the conduit metaphor and the way it
implies the transmission of information, they do not
offer an alternative to it. Instead, they describe human
communication as systematic metaphorical relations,
both creative and logical, grounded in bodily experience and cultural tradition. Their goal in Metaphors T#;
Live By (1980) is not to support existing metaphors or
invent new ones, but to draw attention to a variety of
popular metaphors and to describe and illustrate the
complex metaphorical nature ("imaginative rationality") oflanguage.

Some Existing Alternatives
In Communication as Culture (1989), James Carey
describes a ritual view of communication to draw
attention to aspects of communication overlooked
by more popular and pervasive understandings. This
alternative view of is also a kind of conduit metaphor,
but the direction of flow is centrifugal. Carey's ritual
view of communication highlights "sharing,""participation,""association,""fellowship," and "the possession of
a common faith" (18).1he emphasis of"communication
is ritual" on commonness, communion, and community
is directed toward shared beliefs and the maintenance
of society in time rather than imparting information
and the extension of messages in space (18).
While Carey tries to articulate, recuperate and
privilege a ritual view of communication, he casts it
as a counterpart to the transmission view. ''A ritual
view," writes Carey, "does not exclude the processes of
information transmission or attitude change. It merely

contends that one '
aright except insofar
ritualistic view of co
22). However, becat
stand by itself and i
of the transmission
idea-a necessary '
of communication.
Similarly, at the
Association Convc
Rhetorical and C
attempted to comp
communication (d{
as springing from
transmission mode:
We Take Communi
Conceptions and th
took turns articulat
various perspective!
ritual view. Other
embodiment, ritual
nessing, disseminat
In their present~
forth between defir
tion is X"vs. "comm
concern about the
approach to theoriz
members who desir
of the subject (mor
definition and meta
. (e.g., "commt
VIews
ritual view of comr
the panel were parti
appeared more so I
tives offered. Cons,
thoughts amongst 1
varied options offe1
little to successfull'
models and/or the

Exposition is Pa

In order to make
is painting" it is in
more familiar conce
shape understandi1

Lakoff and Johnson
munication by iden: conduit metaphor.
ww how, according
~ seen as containers
:ontainers of words.
s carry (or transmit)
.s of a medium such
another. Lakoff and
ty of understanding
es where context is
iVhere words mean
(1980, 12).
tively point out the
tor and the way it
ation, they do not
ey describe human
tphorical relations,
I in bodily experial in Metaphors We
;ting metaphors or
:ion to a variety of
and illustrate the
tginative rational-

~9), James Carey
nication to draw
ation overlooked
lerstandings. This
:onduit metaphor,
gal. Carey's ritual
aring, ""participa'the possession of

~"communication

1, and

community
the maintenance
ting information
:e (18).
. recuperate and
ation, he casts it
1 view. "A ritual
the processes of
:hange. It merely

Valerie Peterson

contends that one cannot understand these processes
aright except insofar as they are cast within an essentially
ritualistic view of communication and social order" (2122). However, because Carey's alternative view does not
stand by itself and is overshadowed by the dominance
of the transmission model, it remains a supplemental
idea-a necessary "other" to the main understanding
of communication.
Similarly, at the 2002 National Communication
Association Convention, a panel sponsored by the
Rhetorical and Communication Theory Division
attempted to complicate dominant understandings of
communication (described in introductory comments
as springing from the conduit metaphor and various
transmission models). As part of a panel titled "What
We Take Communication to be: Alternative Theoretical
Conceptions and their Consequences," invited scholars
took turns articulating views of communication from
various perspectives. One of the scholars discussed the
ritual view. Other perspectives/views discussed were
embodiment, ritual, practice, failure, translation, witnessing, dissemination, and transcendence.
In their presentations, panelists often slid back and
forth between definition and metaphor ("communication is X"vs. "communication as X") and expressed little
concern about the distinction. The playful, shotgun
approach to theorizing was criticized by some audience
members who desired a more comprehensive treatment
of the subject (more discussion of differences between
definition and metaphor) and/or a more inclusive list of
views (e.g., "communication is/as power"). Like Carey's
ritual view of communication, the views presented on
the panel were partial (each its own "minority" view) and
appeared more so because of the number of perspectives offered. Consequently, while the panel provoked
thoughts amongst the scholars present, the various and
varied options offered by this coalition of panelists did
little to successfully challenge dominant transmission
models and/or the conduit metaphor.

Exposition is Painting
In order to make sense of the metaphor "exposition
is painting" it is important to explore the second and
more familiar concept/term of the pair and how it might
shape understandings of the first. In most instances,

painting is an art, though some kinds
of painting are more decorative than
other kinds. A person might paint a
house in order to protect and beautify
it, or paint a canvas in an effort to
create an aesthetically pleasing artifact worth of display. The examples of
painting offered here are drawn from
the latter sort, but anyone familiar
with the intricacies of architectural or
industrial painting could find counterparts in those practices consistent
with the metaphor at issue.
Painting is a process (not simply
a product) done by a person (or
people). This means successful painting requires time-related know-how:
knowing when to do what and knowing how long to allow for various
stages of the process. In order to paint,
painters make use of media (e.g., the
paint itself and any additives) and
tools (e.g., brushes, palette knives).
They also use methods and techniques (e.g., layering to create texture
and painting straight from the tube),
rules or maxims of painting (e.g., lay
in larger areas of color first), and any
native or acquired talents of their own.
Because some paintings are judged as
better or worse than other paintings,
the methods and techniques of those
who paint "better" work has been
studied, approximated, and taught.
This is what makes painting a social
practice and a cultural practice. It is
also what makes painting an art and
not simply a knack or instinctive
talent.
There are too many methods and
techniques of good painting to list,
but a few are offered here to suggest
what the metaphor "exposition is
painting" highlights and what it can
contribute to an understanding of
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expository speech and writing. In general, a good painting begins with the preparation of the painting surface
so that it will accept paint and other media as desired.
If realism is an aim, it is wise to start with thin and light
media (or underpainting), and move toward thick and
heavy media only after the layout and direction of the
painting is established. Also, it makes sense to paint
large, vague areas of shape and color first, only later
bringing the painting into focus with smaller details
and accents. If aims lean towards expression and impact,
it helps to make full use of the tools, media, methods,
and techniques available.
In any case, good painting requires consideration
of elements such as balance, contrast, line, movement,
shape, scale, perspective, and color and how these elements relate to each other in the painting as it unfolds
and as they might function in the finished product.
For example, more seasoned painters know that bright
and more highly saturated (truer) hues (colors) come
forward and appear larger to the eye while darker and
less saturated colors (those mixed with white, black, or
colors that muddy) tend to recede from view. They also
know that different brushes work better for different
effects, that shadows usually have purple in them, that
distortion is sometimes beneficial, and that objects
often appear to have colors of objects nearby in them
(and paints should be mixed to account for this visual
effect).
Relating components of painting to exposition
shows how the one concept (painting) can help people
make sense of the other concept (exposition) in useful
ways. Like painting, exposition is an art that may be
more or less decorative. The purposes of exposition
may be simply to get important information across to
a reader, or the aim may also be to describe a scene, set
an emotional tone, and/or build community. Also like
painting, exposition is a process done by people who
need to manage their time wisely (know what to do
when). In order to speak or write, writers make use
of the medium of language (e.g., words-the speaker
or writer's own, as well as citations from others), tools
(e.g., pen and paper, computer software), and methods
and techniques (e.g., figures of speech, organizational
schemes, modeling the sentence structures of others).
Speakers and writers also make use of rules or maxims
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of writing (e.g., define unfamiliar terms, don't introduce
too many characters or ideas at once), and any native or
acquired talents of their own. Because some speeches
and writings are judged better than others, methods and
techniques of those who speak and write "better" have
been studied, approximated, and taught as an art.
Good exposition is a complex process but it is similar
in many ways to good painting. In general, good work
begins well before pen touches paper or fingers touch
a keyboard. First, familiarity with the writing medium
is needed (e.g., developing a wide vocabulary, knowing
how to cite sources, learning how to use software). If
realism is an aim, it is wise to start with a rough sketch or
an outline to structure the material offered to the reader.
Once subsections of the exposition are envisioned, and
the larger structures of writing established, smaller elements can be developed more fully. If aims lean towards
expression and impact, it helps to make ample use of
available writing tools, media, methods, and techniques
(e.g., use of a writer's journal, a wide vocabulary, figures
of speech and tropes, creative or idiosyncratic organization, modeling the writing style of others). In all cases,
however, the art of writing consists in knowing when
and how to appropriately use these various elements.
Good exposition requires consideration of elements
such as balance, contrast, order, temporality, logic, clarity,
pace, scene-building, narration, person, development of
scene and character, and how these elements relate to
each other in the writing as it unfolds and as they might
function in the finished product. For example, more
seasoned speakers and writers know that it helps to start
with a definition of important terms and that different
words and expressions are appropriate to different audiences. They also know that readers often read what they
think instead of what is there (and adjustments for this
need to be made), and that transitions are often helpful
between sections of speech or text.
The metaphor "exposition is painting" is useful, but
partial. As Lakoff and Johnson explain, "the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of
a concept in terms of another ... will necessarily hide
other aspects of the concept" (10). If the concepts of
"exposition" and "painting" were the same, there would
be no value in understanding the former in terms of the
latter. Because they are different, "exposition is painting"

necessarily highlights some aspects of
exposition and hides others.
One obvious difficulty with the
"exposition is painting" metaphor is
the differences between the media of
painting (e.g., paint, water, and oil)
and the media of communication
(e.g., words and images). While it
may be possible to mix or buy new
colors to add to a palette, there is
only a finite range of possible colors
that painters can use. This is not true
oflanguage media. The possibility of
creating new words and using these
words in new and different ways is a
kind of media magic that no other
art can claim.
Another difficulty with the
"exposition is painting" metaphor is
the difference between the eye and
the ear. Components of the visual
environment (e.g., color and line)
differ from those of oral and written
composition (e.g., pitch and word
choice). Because each practice has
its own aesthetic, the aesthetics of
painting would not simply translate
to those of exposition. Also, the
holistic and near-instantaneous way
visuals are received (seen) is different
from the temporally stretched-out
way oral/written texts are received
(heard/read). There is, however, some
comparison between oral/written
texts and more complex visual art that
has enough going on in it to generate
thought across time.
Compared to the conduit
metaphor, however, the metaphor
"exposition is painting" shows significant strengths. It highlights artistic
and creative aspects of communication without "hiding" the possibilities
of information transfer (ideas and
words, like visions and images, can
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r
be shared). As an entailment of the
broader metaphor "communication
is an art," which humanizes matters
and makes room for comparison with
concrete artistic experience, "exposition is painting" is evocative enough
to generate multiple comparisons
that seem to ring true with experience. Unlike the transmission model,
the metaphor "exposition is painting"
does not privilege receivers (viewers
of paintings), but neither does it discount them from the communication
process. The metaphor also suggests
how communicators may change
as a consequence of the process of
exposition Qust as painters may learn
from other artists and from their own
efforts and just as viewers of paintings
may be affected by what they see).
Highlighting process in addition
to product, the metaphor "exposition is painting" draws attention to
activities (process-verbs) as well as
objects (stuff-nouns). Thus, media,
tools, methods, techniques, maxims,
and talent appear as systematic and
integrated facets of expository communication rather than as discrete
elements. This contrasts with the conduit metaphor and its often troubled
distinctions between sender, message,
and channel (e.g., is the sender's
body part of the sender? part of the
channel? part of both?). Despite its
limitations, the "exposition is painting" metaphor corrects weaknesses of
the conduit metaphor. Its strengths
recommend it as a useful alternative
for those who theorize, teach, and
practice communication.

Persuasion is Throwing
The conceptualization of persuasive communication can be traced

back to the ancient Greeks and their theorization of
rhetoric. For Socrates, Plato, and others who preferred
dialectic and philosophical inquiry, rhetoric was a less
praiseworthy sort of communication, one that sought
shortcuts to knowledge, swayed the uneducated, and
could be used to make the weaker argument appear the
stronger. For Aristotle, however, "rhetoric" had no necessarily negative connotation, in itself. Instead, the power
oflanguage to transform its hearers was recognized as
simply "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the
available means of persuasion'' (36). This power could
be used by the just or the unjust, for good or ill, in any
context where political speech might occur.
More recently, events in World War II and the
proliferation of mass media have inspired scholarship
regarding negative powers of persuasive language: the
way words and images inspire hate, justify evil, and
move audiences to act against their own interests and
towards the interests of others (e.g., corporations, governments, ideologies). Much of this scholarship marks
a return to more negative understandings of rhetoric,
persuasion, and even the more traditionally neutral
term "argument."
As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) demonstrate, the
conceptual metaphor "argument is war" is reflected in
everyday English language expressions including "your
claims are indefensible ... He attacked every weak
point in my argument ... His criticisms were right
on target ... He shot down all of my arguments" (4).
Lakoff and Johnson show how the metaphor "argument is war" is not simply a linguistic figure, but a way
of understanding that is profoundly woven into the
culture. "[It] structure[s] (at least in part) what we do
and how we understand what we are doing when we
argue" (5). As a consequence, other possible understandings of argument that might be generated by different
but related metaphors (e.g., argument is wrestling) are
overshadowed.
Many understandings of persuasion are similarly
limited. Metaphors such as "persuasion is trickery" and
"persuasion is seduction'' most closely attend to negative
consequences of persuasion. These and related metaphors are effective at highlighting some of the dangers
of persuasion, but they hide many of the ways in which
persuasion can be characterized by good intentions and
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good outcomes (e.g., good statesmanship, good parenting practices, honest and thoughtful wooing). The
metaphor "persuasion is throwing" is offered as a way to
bring the Aristotelian recognition of power and moral
neutrality back to the understanding of persuasion.
In order to make sense of the metaphor "persuasion
is throwing" it is important to explore the second and
more familiar concept/term of the pair and how it might
shape understandings of the first. Like painting, throwing pottery is an art, and it is perhaps a more demanding
basic skill to attain because proper sensitivity and timing
are crucial, and mistakes with the clay are often final.
Vessels thrown can range from simple and functional
to complex and decorative, but the process of creating
the basic forms upon which other techniques may be
practiced is much the same. For those who prefer to
work without a wheel, the metaphor "persuasion is
potmaking" might be preferable. In this case, throwing
still involves clay, but pots are "built up" by hand.
Throwing is a process done by a person. This means
successful throwing, like successful painting, requires
time-related know-how. The components of throwing
pots include media (e.g., the clay, water), tools (e.g.,
hands, sponge), methods and techniques (e.g., use of
calipers for measurement), rules or maxims of throwing
(gradually decrease pressure on the clay as you progress), and any native or acquired talents of the potter.
Because some throwing is judged better, methods and
techniques of those who throw "better" work has been
studied, approximated, and taught as an art.
Many methods and techniques of good pottery
throwing exist. A few are offered here to suggest what
the metaphor "persuasion is throwing" highlights and
what it can contribute to an understanding of persuasive
speech and writing. In general, a potter begins with
the selection and preparation of the clay. A workable
amount of clay is wedged (kneaded) until it is ready
(otherwise the clay may lose its integrity later in the
process).Then the clay is shaped into a cone or ball and
firmly adhered to the surface of the wheel. The next task
of throwing is to center the clay. This involves bringing
the wheel to a high speed, repeatedly bathing the clay
in fresh water to reduce friction, and compressing the
clay firmly, by hand, with well-braced force.
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When the clay is centered, a form is opened by
pushing into the middle of the mound with fingers or
thumb. The sides of the resulting low bowl or volcano
shape can then be worked upwards. This is done with
the strategic exertion of pressure on either side of the
wall of the vessel, pulling clay up slowly from the base
of the vessel to the top. Because different clays have different characteristics of resilience and plasticity, practice
with a wide variety of clays and familiarity with the clay
at hand helps the potter know how to proceed. As the
form grows, the speed of the wheel should be reduced
to cut back on the effects of centrifugal force. The height
of the form should be established first, then specifics of
its curvature articulated. The final step of throwing is
removing the form from the wheel, which is easier if
the base of the form is scored. A string or wire, water,
and pot-lifters make this process easier.
Relating components of throwing to persuasion
shows how the one concept helps make sense of the
other. Like throwing, persuasion is an art that may be
more or less effective, well executed, and/or beautiful.
The purposes of persuasion may be a change in attitude
or action, but there is always a change involved. Also like
throwing, persuasion is a temporally sensitive process.
Persuaders need to choreograph their performances,
saying the right kinds of things at the right times.
Like expository speakers and writers, persuaders
make use of the medium of language. The difference
is persuaders think of audiences as a kind of medium
to be manipulated to their persuasive ends. Persuasion
involves tools of speech and writing (e.g., words, images)
and methods and techniques of persuasion (e.g., emotional appeals, the use of expert testimony). Persuaders
also make use of rules or maxims of persuasion (e.g.,
speak to audience needs and interests, ask early for more
than is ultimately desired), and any native or acquired
talents of their own.
Persuading is a complex process but similar in many
ways to throwing pots. In general, persuaders need to
know the extent of and/or have faith in their own persuasive skills. Good persuaders begin by attending to
the audience. Persuaders may choose better (e.g., more
receptive, more intelligent, more manageable) audience
members from a larger pool. They may prepare audiences for persuasive messages with other techniques of
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manipulation, but only to the degree that the integrity of
audience members is maintained (otherwise, problems
may develop later). In any case, persuaders try early
on to connect (identify) with the audience and/or to
make a good impression (establish ethos). Without
this contact, other manipulations will prove difficult if
not impossible.
Enabled by connections established at the outset,
persuaders need to minimize friction while preparing
audiences to follow their lead. Audiences should to be
coaxed towards change in ways that do not compromise
or overextend their capacity for flexibility (otherwise
persuasion becomes coercion, force, or torture). Often
this requires repeated efforts in the same direction,
patience, qualification of claims, and sensitivity to
audience responses in the moment. As audiences come
closer to approximating the perspectives of persuaders,
they require less argumentative pressure and are in a
better position to adopt details of the change of attitude or action recommended. Once audience members
are persuaded to think or act differently, ties between
persuaders and audience members may be cut, but separation is not always simple and newly formed attitudes
can still collapse or suffer damage.
Like "exposition is painting," the metaphor "persuasion is throwing" is useful but partial. It necessarily
highlights some aspects of persuasion while hiding
others. An obvious difficulty with this metaphor is
that audiences of persuasion are compared to clay,
a medium that is complex, plastic, and somewhat
resistant to manipulation, but lacking its own volition.
From this perspective, the persuader creates not simply
messages, but the audience itself-changed into a new
form through strategic manipulation. As a result, the
contribution of the audience to the process of persuasion is hidden.
Still, compared to "argument is war," "persuasion is
trickery," and "persuasion is seduction," the metaphor
"persuasion is throwing" is useful. Like "exposition is
painting,""persuasion is throwing" is related to the larger
metaphor "communication is an art," and highlights the
artistic, creative, and potentially positive aspects of persuaders and persuasive communication. Because it likens
audience members to clay, it highlights the malleable
quality of humans-their vulnerability and fragility-
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and the corresponding responsibility of action required
of persuaders in order to bring about good/beautiful
results. The metaphor "persuasion is throwing" also
highlights the temporal nature of persuasion (see Leff,
1986), as well as how persuasion may be assessed as more
or less successful, good, or beautiful depending on the
people/society/culture who judge it.
The metaphor "persuasion is throwing" does well
when compared to the conduit metaphor because it
reflects the fact of transmission. It also suggests how
communicators learn how to persuade Qust as potters
learn from other artists and from their own successes
and failures) and how audiences may be changed
as a consequence of the process of persuasion. Like
the metaphor "exposition is painting," "persuasion is
throwing" highlights process in addition to product, and
integration in addition to discrete elements. Despite its
limitations, the strengths of the "persuasion is throwing"
metaphor recommend it as a useful alternative metaphor
for understanding communication.

Conclusion
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No one metaphor can adequately tackle the complex
phenomenon that is human communication. Yet people
in positions of relative power such as teachers of speech
and writing, theorists oflanguage and communication,
political and social leaders, and parents of young children, are in positions where they may impose metaphors
of human communication on others. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the metaphors they suggest in language,
embody in practice, and extrapolate into models or
paradigms, help shape understandings of human communication that we all live by. They also highlight some
qualities of communication while hiding others.
''A metaphor in a political or economic system, by
virtue of what it hides, can lead to human degradation''
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 236). This may very well be
true of the conduit metaphor. While the conduit metaphor and the transmission models of communication
it supports may be adequate for understanding some
basic communication processes and simple information
transfer, they are not adequate for understanding and
accounting for other aspects of communication.
For these and other reasons, "painting is exposition''
and "throwing is persuasion'' should be considered viable
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alternatives to the conduit metaphor. While an immediate paradigm shift is unlikely, benefits could result if
powerful individuals were to start living by these artistic
and humanistic metaphors, sharing them with their students, using them to guide their research, and theorizing
them into new models and paradigms. As avenues to
understanding concepts that govern thought and action
in everyday life, they provide fruitful perspectives from
which to approach not only processes and components,
but nuances and wonders of human communication.
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